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THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY DIMENSIONS:
THE CLASSICAL PARADIGM REVISITED
"TRANS-ATLANTIC RELATIONS IN TURMOIL: NATO AND THE FUTURE
OF EUROPE"
Geoffrey Smith'
You have invited me to talk about the condition of transatlantic
relations - NATO in turmoil. There is one fundamental reason for the
difficulties NATO has been experiencing - the problems in relations
between the United States and its European allies. We are, quite sim-
ply, paying the price for the end of the Cold War. It is an outcome, of
course, that we have all wanted, but none of us would have ever want-
ed the difficulties we are now experiencing. None of us would have
wished that the Cold War would have not ended. However, it certainly
does make life more difficult in certain respects.
For NATO, it removes what has always been regarded as the very
justification for its existence - to provide a balance in Europe against
a hostile Soviet Union. Now there is no Soviet Union. We are not even
sure whether Russia is going to be hostile or benign. None of us can
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be certain about that at this moment. For most people looking at the
situation in Europe today, it is very different than what it was in the
years of the Cold War. There is no sense, living in Europe, of the
threat that the Soviet Union used to present. It is a very difficult matter
to hold together an international alliance without there being an obvi-
ous, easily recognizable threat. So long as the Soviet Union was there,
providing that threat, none of the allies, the United States and its Euro-
pean counterparts, wanted to risk jeopardizing the security relationship
between us. It was that realization that stopped any one of us from
pushing disagreement on other matters, be it economics, trade, or
anything else, too far. There was always the consideration: "Be careful
of the security relation. That is what matters. Do not run the risk."
First of all, if the Cold War had still been going, the Uruguay Round
of trade negotiations would have been completed earlier and with less
tension and bitterness than existed before a settlement was reached.
Now, without the old Soviet threat, it becomes much more difficult,
not only to hold the alliance together in the old sense, but to cope with
a range of new challenges that have now emerged. Let me list first
Bosnia.
Second, there are differences about the enlargement of NATO.
Should NATO take into membership the countries of Eastern Europe
that are now clamoring to join? The countries that used to be part of
the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet empire, now free, are desperately anxious
to preserve their freedom and are wanting to come in. Should we not
say, "Yes, we welcome you to membership?" If that is what they
want, and that is what they believe, then we will secure their freedom
in the future. That is what they want, but is it quite as simple as that?
This is another issue that has come up now and presents a new and
fresh challenge. This is because there are different views and different
voices among the membership of the alliance.
A third new challenge is that the different members of NATO are
now worried about different security dangers. Germany is particularly
concerned about preserving stability in Central and Eastern Europe. Its
eyes are focused there in terms of its own security concerns. France,
Italy, and Spain look south. They are concerned about the problems
presented by Islamic fundamentalists in North Africa and the Middle
East, but particularly North Africa. In each case - the Germans look-
ing east, the French, Italians, and Spanish looking south - are con-
cerned about the possibility of instability and of uncontrolled migra-
tion, which would cause social and economic problems for their societ-
ies. Although there are concerns in each case about the specific kinds
of threat to their society, each is looking in different directions. No
longer are all the members of NATO concerned, above all, with the
same kind of threat from the same kind of direction. This is bound to
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cause, as it has done, certain strains within the alliance.
The French, in particular, feel that the United States is neither as
sympathetic or as sensitive to its concerns: the rise of Islamic funda-
mentalism in Algeria, for example. There is a feeling that the other
countries in the alliance are not as aware as they ought to be of the
dangers and problems that we in Europe face. Which raises the ques-
tion that some countries have of the continued relevance of the alliance
in this sense - not all together, but in this sense of their concern that
their partners are not sharing the same sense of awareness of the prob-
lems that they used to share in the days of the Cold War.
Then finally, among the new challenges there is the growing im-
portance of Asia. Asia seems to eclipse a purely transatlantic alliance,
particularly when the United States, the largest, most powerful country
in the alliance, is depended upon by all of NATO. It is the United
States that is particularly concerned about the rising importance of
Asia. Now, if one looks at the new challenges and puts all of these
new challenges in the context of the new circumstances due to the end
of the Cold War, it is easy to see how NATO could collapse. Before
you conclude that I believe that it is bound to collapse, before we
conclude that it might not matter if we were to see the death of NATO
because it has served it purpose or achieved its historic aim, there are
two fundamental questions we ought to ask ourselves.
The first is whether NATO really does still have a purpose in the
circumstances of today or are we keeping it going simply from a mix-
ture of habit and intellectual timidity? Are we simply afraid to see the
new world as it really is? This is the first fundamental question that I
think we ought to ask ourselves.
The second fundamental question is whether there still is a job for
NATO to do. Do these new challenges present such difficulties, are
they going to undermine harmony and comfortability within the alliance
to such an extent that it will be impossible for NATO to be as effective
in the future as it has been in the past?
First, does NATO have still a role in the world today? I believe it
has. I think it has a double purpose. First of all, and here I am very
much covering the very same kind of ground as Peter Rodman has but
with a slightly different emphasis, I agree that we need to balance
power in Europe. Whether Russia is hostile or not, we certainly need
to have strength in Western Europe. I would put it in terms of an
insurance policy. We do not know now whether Russia is going to be
sour or not. Many Russian experts, and all of us, have probably heard
many other Russian experts give their own prognostication on the
future of Russia and the countries that used to be part of the Soviet
Union. I am not going to attempt to hazard a guess at this moment
about that future. I will only say that I do not believe that anybody,
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however knowledgeable they may be about Russian history and Russian
affairs in general, can be sure whether Russia is going to be a friendly
nation or become sour and hostile in the future. However, it is wise for
us to make sure that we have an insurance policy. When we pay premi-
ums for health insurance, we do not know whether we are going to be
sick, but it is wise to take out the insurance policy.
Equally, in the case of Russia, we know the military strength it
possesses. We know that it is now in a politically unstable situation and
that it is wise "to pay the insurance policy" and be in a position to
balance Russian strength if that becomes necessary. Once NATO has
been allowed to wither away and die, it will never be possible to revive
it again. Once NATO is over, it will be dead. You will not be able to
bring it back to life. As Peter mentioned, with minimal cost, I believe
it is wise to keep NATO alive.
The second reason why I think it is wise to adopt the other pur-
pose for NATO is that there are probably going to be a range of differ-
ent security challenges in the future. Peter mentioned a number of the
possibilities. I am not going to guess as to which of those possibilities
is the most likely. I do believe, though, that we would be very unwise
if we did not put ourselves in the position of being able to meet securi-
ty challenges in the future. One of the conditions for meeting security
challenges in the future is that the United States should be prepared to
take action where it is necessary. But the other condition for the United
States, intervening wherever there is a really serious challenge, is that
the United States not be so alone. I do not think that you would have
fought the Gulf War if there had been no allies taking part in that
conflict with you. Without the engagement of allies beside you, it
would not have been possible to get that vote through the Senate to
authorize President Bush to take action. I think that there is a psycho-
logical need, and a very reasonable psychological need, for the United
States to feel that it is not the only one bearing the burden of pre-
serving stability in troubled spots where action is required. NATO is a
mechanism for encouraging cooperation and the habit of working to-
gether and thinking together for international security. It facilitates
cooperation outside the NATO area, as well as providing a mechanism
for action outside that area.
But even if I am right on this, and even if there is this double
purpose for NATO in the future, are the new challenges so great that
they have destroyed the capacity for cooperation? Are they, in other
words, terminal disagreements? I think all of them could be and none
of them need to be. Let me just quickly, if I may, run down them
again. The first is Bosnia. I cannot, in the time available, say anything
very deep or significant or wide ranging on a tragedy of that nature. I
just want to make two points. First, the main danger to NATO from
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Bosnia, and the main danger to the alliance, is not failing to solve the
problem. Tragic though that would be, the main danger is of a military
involvement that fails and proves disastrous. It would be very easy
indeed for any involvement in Bosnia, any intervention, to fail militari-
ly because this is territory that is ideal for guerilla warfare. Any inter-
vention that stood the slightest chance of success would have to be a
fairly major exercise. It would have to include the United States; it
would have to include us in Britain. We have troops and the French
have troops on the ground operating for the United Nations for the
moment, but the scale of NATO operation that would be required for
effective NATO military intervention in Bosnia would be on a different
scale altogether. I do not believe that any of us have got the political
will to do that. Any intervention in Bosnia would be a major gamble
with a high probability of failure. If we did intervene and fail, the risk
for the alliance, the bitterness between one member country and anoth-
er, would be very damaging and undermining.
Next is the question of enlargement. The case for enlargement is a
very clear and simple one. I mentioned it a few minutes ago, but I
want to put three considerations before you to suggest that it is not
quite as simple as that. First, the enlargement of NATO, pushing the
boundaries of NATO eastward closer and closer to the Russian bor-
ders, would cause, or at least encourage, precisely the development
that we least want. That is the rise, the revival, of an aggressive Rus-
sian nationalism. That objection by itself would not be sufficient to
counter my feeling that enlargement would be desirable if it were not
for the two other factors.
One is that it would bring a new and sharp division between those
countries aspiring to join NATO that were brought into alliance and
those that were left outside, whether permanently or temporarily. This
would not matter, of course, unless there was a hostile Russia. After
all, there is not much point in enlarging NATO unless one fears the
real possibility that there might be a hostile Russia. What would hap-
pen with the enlargement is that if Russia were to become sour again,
we would find that those countries that were most exposed and least
likely to be brought into NATO would then be made more vulnerable,
not less.
However, it is the third consideration that holds the most danger
for the alliance. It would be multiplying commitments without doing
anything to increase our capability to meet those commitments. I have
been, as always, charmed, and perhaps a little bit puzzled, with the
attention that you in this country pay to Valentine's Day. Speaking as
an Englishman, we are used to Valentine's Day. We do not take it
anything like you do, or as seriously as you do. Scattering NATO
commitments around is not the same as sending out a few additional
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valentines as a gesture of casual affection. When you bring a country
into NATO, the commitment you are making is a very serious one -
the commitment that you in the United States, that we in Britain and
every other allied nation would be making. It is a commitment to go to
war, if necessary, for the protection and defense of that country. Dur-
ing the Cold War, we made such commitments. That is, we made
those commitments, we meant what we said, and said what we meant.
Our commitments were believed. The alliance was credible. I am not
convinced that if we spread those commitments around now - unless
we are prepared, you and we, to have troops stationed in Eastern
Europe. I do not believe any of us is prepared for that. Unless we are
prepared to take steps that would, if necessary, make those commit-
ments seem credible, they would look like paper guarantees. Paper
guarantees can have the effect of undermining the credibility that
NATO has enjoyed up until now. That credibility has been the main
reason for its success.
I have two final points. I was speaking of the threat from the south
that is of such concern to NATO members. This connection is a chal-
lenge for the alliance where things could go wrong. This will not hap-
pen unless some countries feel that we are not as responsive to their
concerns, that our own thinking is stuck in the time warp of the Cold
War. If NATO is to have vitality in the future, we have got to be
responsive to these new challenges.
The last is the burning importance of Asia. We in Europe would
be very unwise if we regard this as a threat to us. It seems to me
absolutely right and natural that you in the United States would recog-
nize, as you are doing, the greater importance that Asia will have for
you. Your connections with Asia will multiply and intensify. It would
be very unwise of us in Europe to regard that as a threat to our rela-
tionship, friendship, and connection with you.
Equally, I think you in the United States would be wise to appreci-
ate the limits of Asia in providing allies. I do not want to get into a
deep discussion - there is not time, and it would not be appropriate -
about the political values and ideas of Asia as compared to the United
States and Europe. I am doubtful that in the years immediately ahead
there is the prospect of the United States having allies with the same
extent of shared history, political values, and geopolitical objectives
that you share with a number of countries in Europe. These are not al-
ternatives. I am not suggesting that it would be undesirable to broaden
the pattern of partnership and bring in more Asian countries. I think
that would be highly desirable. Even if that happens, it is not going to
happen very quickly and you will not achieve the same degree of depth
as in the relationship with Europe. There is no need to choose between
relationships with Asia or relationships with Europe.
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